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Should	the	Law	Convict	Those	Who	Act	from	Conviction?	Reflections	on	a	
Demands-of-Conscience	Criminal	Defense‡	
David	Lefkowitz,	University	of	Richmond	
How	should	the	judge	or	jury	in	a	just	criminal	court	treat	a	civil	disobedient,	
someone	who	performs	a	conscientiously	motivated	communicative	breach	of	the	
criminal	law?		In	her	excellent	new	book	Conscience	and	Conviction:	The	Case	for	Civil	
Disobedience,	Kimberley	Brownlee	boldly	contends	that	all	else	equal	a	court	of	law	
should	neither	convict	nor	punish	such	offenders.1		Rather,	people	who	perform	
conscientiously	motivated	communicative	acts	of	disobedience	to	law	ought	to	enjoy	
what	she	labels	a	demands-of-conviction	excusatory	defense	for	their	criminal	
conduct.2		Though	I	agree	with	Brownlee	that	all	else	equal	civil	disobedients	ought	
to	be	fully	exculpated	for	their	criminal	conduct,	I	believe	she	mischaracterizes	the	
nature	of	the	criminal	defense	to	which	they	are	entitled.		Whereas	Brownlee	
maintains	that	such	actors	ought	to	be	excused	for	their	criminal	breach,	I	argue	that	
they	ought	to	enjoy	a	justification	defense.	Acts	of	civil	disobedience	are	not	
(morally)	wrongful	violations	of	the	law	for	which	an	actor	ought	not	to	be	blamed,	
as	Brownlee	would	have	it.		They	are	violations	of	the	law	that	are	not	(morally)	
wrong	in	virtue	of	their	illegality.		It	is	the	absence	of	wrongdoing,	and	not	merely	
																																																								
‡	Published	in	Criminal	Law	and	Philosophy	10	(2016):	657-675.	
1	Brownlee	(2012).	
2	Brownlee	distinguishes	between	conscientious	conviction	and	conscience,	with	the	former	
describing	a	serious	and	sincere,	though	possibly	mistaken,	belief	in	a	moral	norm	and	the	latter	
referring	to	“a	set	of	practical	moral	skills	that	stem	from	an	inward	knowledge	of	the	working	of	our	
own	mind	and	heart”	Brownlee	(2012:	52).		Since	Brownlee’s	nomenclature	is	not	widespread,	I	have	
used	the	phrase	‘demands	of	conscience’	in	this	paper’s	title.		Henceforth,	however,	I	follow	Brownlee	
in	using	the	phrase	‘demands-of-conviction’	to	refer	to	a	criminal	defense	for	those	who	are	
motivated	to	violate	the	law	by	a	conscientiously	held	conviction.	
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the	absence	of	fault,	that	renders	the	conviction	and	punishment	of	those	who	
perform	acts	of	civil	disobedience	inappropriate.	
On	its	face	this	criticism	of	Brownlee’s	project	may	seem	disappointingly	
small.		However,	the	difference	between	being	justified	in	one’s	conduct	and	merely	
being	excused	for	it	is	one	Brownlee	herself	acknowledges	to	be	of	great	importance	
to	any	self-respecting	person,	and	rightly	so	as	I	explain	below.3		Moreover	the	
account	of	legal	defenses	I	offer	here	allows	for	a	more	nuanced	account	than	does	
Brownlee’s	of	the	ways	in	which	a	person	may	point	to	her	conscientious	
convictions	to	defend	her	norm-violating	conduct.		As	I	explain	below,	for	example,	
it	reveals	the	partial	truth	in	both	Brownlee’s	and	Jeremy	Horder’s	opposing	views	
on	the	availability	to	civil	disobedients	of	a	demands-of-conviction	excusatory	
defense.		Consider,	too,	that	the	plausibility	of	an	argument	for	a	new	criminal	
defense	such	as	the	one	Brownlee	defends	likely	depends	to	a	considerable	extent	
on	how	well	it	coheres	with,	or	follows	from,	our	best	understanding	of	criminal	
defenses	in	general.		To	the	extent	that	recasting	a	demands-of-conviction	defense	
as	a	justification	rather	than	an	excuse	advances	this	end,	it	serves	to	buttress	the	
case	for	its	legal	recognition.		Finally,	consideration	of	a	novel	criminal	defense	
provides	an	opportunity	to	revisit,	reconceive,	and	perhaps	rationally	reconstruct	
those	defenses	already	recognized	in	a	particular	jurisdiction	(or	in	many	
jurisdictions).		Even	those	unconcerned	with	conscientiously	motivated	
disobedience	to	law,	then,	may	have	reason	to	pay	careful	attention	to	the	
																																																								
3	Brownlee	(2012:	161).	
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conclusions	drawn	by	those	like	Brownlee	and	me	whose	analysis	of	criminal	
defenses	is	motivated	by	such	a	concern.				
I	begin	in	section	I	with	a	brief	description	of	Brownlee’s	account	of	
conscientious	conviction,	civil	disobedience,	and	the	moral	right	to	conscientious	
action.		In	section	II	I	offer	an	analysis	of	the	nature	of	justificatory	and	excusatory	
legal	defenses.		Justificatory	legal	defenses	establish	that	an	agent	did	no	wrong	in	
virtue	of	performing	a	criminally	proscribed	act	as	such	by	demonstrating	to	the	
law’s	satisfaction	that	the	particular	criminal	law	the	defendant	breached	lacked	
legitimate	authority	over	her	in	the	context	in	which	she	violated	it.		Drawing	on	
Joseph	Raz’s	account	of	the	conditions	under	which	law	enjoys	legitimate	authority,	
I	argue	that	justificatory	legal	defenses	involve	the	state’s	recognition	either	that	
defendants	are	more	likely	to	act	on	an	undefeated	reason	by	acting	on	their	own	
judgment	than	by	deferring	to	the	law,	or	that	within	certain	limits	it	is	more	
important	in	cases	like	the	one	in	question	that	people	act	on	their	own	judgment	
regarding	what	they	ought	to	do	than	that	they	get	it	right.		Contrary	to	what	I	take	
Brownlee’s	position	to	be,	justificatory	legal	defenses	do	not	establish	that	the	
defendant’s	conduct	was	justified	all	things	considered,	only	that	it	was	not	
unjustified	in	virtue	of	being	a	violation	of	the	law.		As	for	legal	excuses,	I	follow	John	
Gardner,	on	whose	analysis	of	justifications	and	excuses	Brownlee	also	draws,	in	
characterizing	them	narrowly	as	wrongful	violations	of	the	law	for	which	the	state	
ought	not	to	fault	defendants	on	the	grounds	that	they	lived	up	to	our	reasonable	or	
justifiable	expectations	of	them.		I	contend	that	the	reasonable	expectations	in	
question	concern	certain	errors	or	malfunctions	in	practical	reasoning	for	which	we	
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ought	not	to	hold	agents	responsible.		Construed	in	this	narrow	manner,	legal	
excuses	constitute	concessions	the	law	makes	to	human	frailty	or	imperfection.		
Brownlee’s	analysis	of	(legal)	excuses	is	importantly	incomplete,	I	argue;	while	she	
rightly	notes	that	paradigmatically	excuses	involve	a	claim	to	be	justified	in	
believing,	albeit	mistakenly,	that	one	was	justified	in	acting	as	one	did,	she	fails	to	
engage	sufficiently	with	the	questions	of	what	can	justify	a	person	in	holding	that	
mistaken	belief	and	why	that	justification	renders	conviction	and	punishment	
inappropriate.														
In	section	III	I	employ	the	analyses	of	justificatory	and	excusatory	legal	
defenses	sketched	above	to	demonstrate	that	Brownlee’s	own	arguments	for	a	
demands-of-conviction	defense	actually	support	its	construal	as	a	justification,	not	
the	excuse	she	seeks	to	defend.		Specifically,	I	contend	that	the	value	of	personal	
autonomy	and	psychological	health	to	which	Brownlee	appeals	grounds	a	moral	
right	to	conscientious	action,	or	perhaps	better,	partly	characterizes	the	principle	of	
humanism	that	Brownlee	identifies	as	the	basis	for	such	a	right.		Moreover,	the	value	
of	autonomy	and	psychological	health	is	not	the	sort	of	consideration	that	can	
excuse	wrongful	conduct,	though	distortions	of	one’s	practical	reasoning	caused	by	
fear	or	anger	in	response	to	threats	to	one’s	autonomy	or	psychological	health	might	
be.		I	briefly	explore	this	last	possibility	in	section	IV,	where	I	argue	that	civil	
disobedients	may	sometimes	have	an	excuse	for	breaches	of	the	criminal	law	that	
fall	outside	the	scope	of	their	right	to	conscientious	action	and	for	which	they	are	
therefore	not	entitled	to	a	justificatory	legal	defense.	I	also	examine	the	
aforementioned	dispute	between	Brownlee	and	Horder	regarding	the	justifiability	
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of	extending	an	excusatory	legal	defense	to	civil	disobedients,	and	argue	that	while	
Brownlee	correctly	concludes	that	such	actors	have	a	prima	facie	claim	to	a	criminal	
defense,	Horder	is	largely	right	when	he	argues	that	they	ought	not	to	be	excused.	
		 Before	I	turn	to	the	tasks	outlined	above,	I	note	two	important	limits	on	the	
scope	of	the	discussion.		First,	as	I	have	indicated	several	times	already,	both	
Brownlee	and	I	take	our	arguments	to	establish	only	prima	facie	or	defeasible	claims	
to	a	justificatory	or	excusatory	demands-of-conviction	defense.		We	aim	to	establish	
what	sort	of	treatment	civil	disobedients	deserve;	that	is,	how	a	criminal	court	ought	
to	treat	them	insofar	as	it	aims	to	respond	to	them	as	responsible	agents.		Other	
moral	considerations	may	sometimes	justify	the	state’s	failure	to	give	defendants	
what	they	deserve,	however.		For	example,	justifiable	concerns	regarding	its	abuse	
may	warrant	a	demands-of-conviction	justificatory	defense	with	a	far	narrower	
scope	than	the	moral	right	to	conscientious	action	it	serves	to	institutionalize.4		
Additionally,	the	need	to	strike	a	balance	between	individuals’	interest	in	
conscientious	action	and	individuals’	interest	in	a	stable	and	effective	state	that	
renders	them	secure	in	their	moral	rights	may	justify	the	state’s	imposing	certain	
burdens	on	those	who	perform	acts	of	civil	disobedience	even	where,	taken	in	
isolation,	such	conduct	does	not	merit	conviction	or	punishment.5		Thus	an	analysis	
of	the	treatment	conscientiously	motivated	law-breakers	deserve	is	unlikely	to	be	a	
																																																								
4	For	illuminating	discussion	of	this	point,	see	Horder	(2004:	15-20);	see	also	Brownlee	(2012:	250-
2).	
5	Brownlee	and	I	dispute	how	best	to	understand	this	argument.		See	Brownlee	(2012:	240-8)	for	
criticisms	of	my	argument	that	the	moral	right	to	civil	disobedience	protects	those	who	perform	such	
acts	from	punishment	but	not	from	penalties;	Lefkowitz	(2007:	218-23).		In	Lefkowitz	(2012)	I	offer	
a	preliminary	response	to	those	criticisms,	but	space	does	not	permit	me	to	address	them	further	
here.		
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complete	account	of	how	a	just	state	ought	to	treat	them.		The	second,	and	related,	
limit	on	my	investigation	concerns	its	almost	exclusive	focus	on	the	trial	stage	of	the	
law’s	response	to	conscientiously	motivated	breaches	of	the	criminal	law.		That	
hardly	exhausts	the	domains	in	which	we	ought	to	consider	how	a	just	state	should	
respond	to	such	acts.		For	example,	we	should	consider	whether	conscientiously	
motivated	disobedience	to	a	particular	law,	even	when	it	is	neither	justified	nor	
excused,	constitutes	a	less	serious	wrong	than	does	non-conscientiously	motivated	
disobedience	to	the	same	law.		If	so,	and	if	punishment	ought	to	be	proportionate	to	
the	moral	seriousness	of	the	wrong,	then	at	least	some	conscientiously	motivated	
law-breakers	might	merit	lesser	sentences	than	“normal”	offenders.		This	question	
concerns	the	sentencing	phase,	and	there	are	others	that	concern	policing	and	
decisions	to	prosecute	conscientiously	motivated	violations	of	the	law.6		One	can	
only	do	so	much	in	a	single	paper,	however;	therefore	I	set	aside	the	issues	
identified	in	this	paragraph	to	focus	on	desert-based	arguments	for	a	demands-of-
conviction	criminal	defense.	
I	
Brownlee	characterizes	a	person	with	a	conscientious	moral	conviction	as	
someone	with	a	sincere	and	serious,	though	possibly	mistaken,	moral	commitment.		
She	spells	out	the	sincerity	and	seriousness	that	are	the	mark	of	a	conscientiously	
held	conviction	in	terms	of	four	conditions	that	together	comprise	the	
communicative	principle	of	conscientiousness.7		A	person	with	a	conscientiously	
																																																								
6	See,	e.g.,	Smith	(2012).	
7	Brownlee	(2012:	29-47).	
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held	conviction	exhibits,	as	best	she	can,	consistency	between	her	moral	judgment,	
her	actions,	and	her	attitude	toward	herself	and	others.		Her	moral	judgment	applies	
universally;	that	is,	to	all	relevantly	similar	agents	in	all	relevantly	similar	
circumstances.		She	does	not	seek	to	evade	the	consequences	of	fidelity	to	her	moral	
conviction	for	the	sake	of	personal	protection,	i.e.	simply	because	doing	so	will	
better	advance	her	self-interest	than	will	non-evasion.		Finally,	all	else	equal	a	fully	
conscientious	actor	is	willing	to	defend	her	moral	conviction	in	a	reasoned	dialogue	
with	others.		Together	with	the	non-evasion	condition,	this	last,	communicative,	
condition	for	the	possession	of	a	conscientious	moral	conviction	sometimes	entails	
the	necessity	of	actively	challenging	existing	social	practices,	including	the	law	and	
public	policy,	as	part	of	an	effort	to	engage	others	in	a	dialogue	regarding	the	justice	
of	those	practices.	
Those	with	conscientious	moral	convictions,	Brownlee	maintains,	enjoy	a	
limited	moral	right	to	act	on	them.8		The	moral	right	to	conscientious	action	is	
grounded	in	a	principle	of	humanism,	according	to	which	“society	has	a	duty	to	
honor	the	fact	that	we	are	reasoning	and	feeling	beings	capable	of	forming	deep	
moral	commitments.”9		The	limits	of	the	moral	right	to	conscientious	action	are	
drawn	by	respect	for	others’	rights,	and	therefore	it	does	not	extend	to	acts	that	
“either	violate	the	dignity	of	others	or	threaten	their	basic	needs.”10		Though	
Brownlee	says	otherwise,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	scope	of	the	right	is	also	
constrained	by	the	requirement	that	genuinely	conscientious	action	be	
																																																								
8	Brownlee	(2012:	140-51).	
9	Brownlee	(2012:	7).	
10	Brownlee	(2012:	141;	149).	
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communicative	in	the	sense	described	above.		Support	for	this	assertion	comes	from	
a	consideration	of	Brownlee’s	characterization	of	civil	disobedience.	
Brownlee	holds	that	civil	disobedience	“must	include	a	deliberate	breach	of	
law	taken	on	the	basis	of	steadfast	personal	commitment	[i.e.	a	conscientious	moral	
conviction]	in	order	to	communicate	with	a	relevantly	placed	audience,	which	is	
usually	society	or	the	government,	our	condemnation	of	a	law	or	set	of	policies.”11	
As	an	expression	of	an	agent’s	conscientious	moral	convictions,	civil	disobedience	
falls	within	the	scope	of	the	moral	right	to	conscientious	action.		Because	it	must	be	
conscientiously	motivated,	only	those	acts	that	meet	certain	process-related	
constraints	that	reflect	the	necessarily	communicative	nature	of	conscientious	
action	qualify	as	civil	disobedience.		Brownlee	spells	out	these	constraints	in	terms	
of	a	civilly	disobedient	actor’s	sensitivity	to	three	reasons	she	has	to	“not	be	overly	
radical”	in	the	form	or	method	she	employs	to	communicate	her	conviction.12		First,	
certain	tactics	may	distract	others’	attention	from	the	conviction	she	seeks	to	
express;	they	may	become	so	focused	on	what	she	did	that	they	pay	little	or	no	
attention	to	her	reasons	for	doing	it.		Second,	the	civilly	disobedient	actor’s	attempt	
to	engage	others	in	a	dialogue	regarding	the	justice	of	the	law	or	policy	she	protests	
will	likely	only	succeed	if	she	treats	(or	is	seen	to	treat)	others	as	interlocutors	with	
whom	she	aspires	to	engage	in	a	rational,	or	reason-giving,	discussion.		Finally,	civil	
disobedients’	awareness	of	their	own	fallibility	gives	them	a	reason	to	be	and	to	
display	modesty	in	their	violation	of	social	norms,	particularly	those	such	as	the	
																																																								
11	Brownlee	(2012:	18).	
12	Brownlee	(2012:	20).	
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laws	of	a	liberal-democratic	state	that	have	some	claim	to	epistemic	superiority.13		
All	else	equal,	any	act	of	disobedience	to	law	that	does	not	reflect	(adequate)	
sensitivity	to	these	reasons	fails	to	be	communicative.		It	follows	that	such	acts	
cannot	be	expressions	of	a	conscientiously	held	conviction,	and	so	their	
permissibility	cannot	be	established	by	appeal	to	a	moral	right	to	conscientious	
action.14	
In	section	IV	I	briefly	consider	one	sort	of	defense	that	might	be	offered	for	
conduct	intended	to	protest	the	injustice	of	a	law	or	policy	that	falls	afoul	of	these	
process-related	constraints	on	civil	disobedience;	what	I	label	failed	attempts	at	civil	
																																																								
13	The	epistemic	authority	of	such	norms	ought	not	to	be	exaggerated,	however,	as	Brownlee	rightly	
argues.	
14	Brownlee	contrasts	civil	disobedience	with	what	she	terms	personal	disobedience:	non-
communicative	violations	of	the	law	motivated	by	personal	conviction	that	are	either	evasive	or	non-
evasive.		Brownlee	rightly	points	out	that,	in	comparison	to	the	civil	disobedient,	we	have	more	
reason	to	doubt	the	seriousness	and	sincerity	of	a	law-breaker’s	claim	to	have	acted	from	moral	
conviction	if	she	attempts	to	evade	the	law’s	detection	of	her	criminal	conduct	and	refuses	to	offer	a	
reasoned	defense	of	the	conviction	on	which	she	allegedly	acted.		At	times,	though,	it	seems	that	
Brownlee	makes	a	stronger	claim,	namely	that	actors	who	do	not	meet	the	communicative	condition	
and	perhaps	also	the	non-evasion	condition	lack	a	conscientious	moral	conviction	altogether.	
Brownlee	frequently	identifies	personal	disobedience	with	what	other	authors	refer	to	as	
conscientious	objection,	and	then	claims	to	reverse	the	standard	liberal	view	by	arguing	that	civil	
disobedients	have	a	stronger	claim	to	accommodation	by	the	state	than	do	personal	disobedients.		I	
think	she	misrepresents	the	views	of	many	liberal	theorists	when	she	equates	their	notion	of	a	
conscientious	objector	with	her	conception	of	a	personal	disobedient.		As	I	read	the	theoretical	
literature	on	principled	disobedience	to	law	(which,	admittedly,	is	far	from	uniform	in	how	it	
characterizes	these	concepts),	what	distinguishes	civil	disobedience	from	conscientious	objection	is	
not	evasion	or	communication	but	whether	the	disobedient	actor	aims	to	bring	about	a	change	to	
existing	law	or	policy	or	merely	seeks	to	be	exempted	from	it.		The	“standard	liberal	view,”	then,	is	
not	that	actors	who	non-communicatively	violate	the	law	have	a	stronger	claim	to	accommodation	by	
the	state	than	do	those	who	do	so	communicatively.		Instead,	the	claim	is	that	the	state	should	be	
more	accommodating	toward	those	who	simply	seek	an	exemption	from	a	law	or	policy	than	it	is	
towards	those	who	violate	the	law	as	part	of	a	political	campaign	to	change	it.		Even	if	the	arguments	
for	the	“standard	liberal	view”	grounded	in	democratic	authority	fail,	as	Brownlee	and	I	both	argue	
they	do,	there	may	be	other	reasons	that	support	it.		The	relative	strength	of	the	claim	to	
accommodation	aside,	what	I	take	to	be	the	standard	liberal	distinction	between	civil	disobedience	
and	conscientious	objection	leaves	room	for	an	argument	that	the	state	ought	to	tolerate	
conscientiously	motivated	disobedience	to	law	even	when	it	is	not	undertaken	for	the	purpose	of	
challenging	law	or	policy.		Contrary	to	Brownlee’s	assertion	(2012:	144-5),	then,	an	argument	like	my	
own	that	grounds	a	right	to	civil	disobedience	in	a	more	general	right	to	political	participation	need	
not	imply	that	the	state	has	a	duty	to	accommodate	conscientious	disobedience	to	law	only	when	
undertaken	for	a	political	aim	by	disempowered	minorities.	
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disobedience.		Primarily,	however,	my	concern	is	with	acts	of	civil	disobedience	as	
Brownlee	characterizes	them.		All	else	equal,	a	just	state	ought	to	accord	those	who	
perform	conscientiously	motivated	communicative	acts	of	disobedience	to	law	a	
demands-of-conviction	legal	defense,	one	that	I	argue	contra	Brownlee	recognizes	
their	conduct	as	justified,	not	excused.			
II	
Normative	defenses	are	responses	to	accusations	of	wrongdoing;	i.e.	to	
accusations	that	a	person	has	violated	a	norm	that	applies	to	her	in	virtue	of	a	
certain	role	she	occupies	or	status	she	has,	such	as	friend,	nurse,	moral	agent,	or	
legal	subject.		They	constitute	attempts	to	demonstrate	to	the	accuser	(and	perhaps	
also	to	third	parties)	that	she	does	not	have	the	reason(s)	she	takes	herself	to	have	
to	blame	the	accused.	Defenses	serve	this	end	in	at	least	four	distinct	ways:	an	actor	
may	contest	the	attribution	of	the	act	to	her;	she	may	deny	that	she	qualified	as	a	
responsible	agent	when	she	“performed”	the	wrong	act	(or	perhaps	better,	when	the	
norm-violating	behavior	occurred);	she	may	contest	the	accusation	that	in	acting	as	
she	did	she	committed	the	wrong	of	which	she	is	accused,	or	she	may	contest	the	
(implicit)	claim	that	she	merits	blame	or	some	other	form	of	censure	for	the	wrong	
she	committed.		The	point	of	the	first	two	defenses	is	to	deny	the	attribution	of	the	
act	or	behavior	to	the	accused.		If	a	person	did	not	perform	the	act	in	question	then	
she	does	not	merit	blame	for	having	done	that	act.	The	point	of	the	second	two	
defenses	is	to	take	responsibility	for	the	act	in	question,	to	acknowledge	or	endorse	
its	attribution	to	one	as	a	responsible	agent,	but	to	argue	either	that	one	has	a	
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justification	for	acting	as	one	did	or	that	one	ought	to	be	excused	for	one’s	wrongful	
action.				
Arguably	this	normative	practice	of	accusation	and	response	is	central	to	
many	actual	criminal	legal	systems,	and	as	a	matter	of	justice,	ought	to	be.		Criminal	
or	legal	defenses	are	responses	to	the	state’s	accusation	of	criminal	wrongdoing;	
that	is,	to	the	charge	that	one	has	acted	wrongly	by	violating	one	or	more	criminal	
laws.		Many	criminal	law	systems	recognize	examples	of	all	four	types	of	defense	to	
an	accusation	of	wrongdoing	described	above.		Since	the	cases	of	interest	in	this	
paper	are	ones	in	which	the	defendant	does	not	protest	the	law’s	attribution	to	her	
of	a	criminal	act,	i.e.	to	the	performance	of	a	token	of	the	type	of	act	described	in	a	
particular	criminal	offense	definition,	I	set	aside	the	first	two	types	of	defenses	and	
focus	on	justifications	and	excuses.		That	strategy	may	strike	some	as	mistaken	since	
civil	disobedients	sometimes	make	remarks	that	might	be	interpreted	as	denying	
their	status	as	responsible	moral	agents.		The	best	known	example,	of	course,	is	
Martin	Luther’s	proclamation:	“here	I	stand,	I	can	do	no	other.”		However,	I	maintain	
that	these	utterances	are	better	interpreted	as	statements	regarding	the	actions	the	
civil	disobedient	takes	herself	to	have	undefeated	reason	to	perform.		Luther’s	claim,	
then,	is	that	as	a	rational	agent,	one	able	to	respond	correctly	to	the	reasons	that	
apply	to	him,	he	cannot	act	other	than	he	does.		Civil	disobedients	make	remarks	like	
these	in	order	to	affirm	their	rationality,	and	thereby	aim	to	rebut	those	who	would	
take	their	deviant,	norm	violating,	conduct	as	evidence	to	the	contrary.15		In	
																																																								
15	See	Brownlee	(2012:	169)	on	this	point.	
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attempting	to	offer	a	justification	or	excuse	for	her	criminal	breach	the	civil	
disobedient	takes	responsibility	for	it.					
Since	both	justificatory	and	excusatory	legal	defenses	result	in	the	
defendant’s	acquittal,	it	may	seem	to	be	of	only	academic	interest	which	of	the	two	
the	accused	may	offer	in	defense	of	her	criminal	conduct.		Yet	as	John	Gardner	notes,	
the	outcome	of	a	trial	in	which	the	defendant	is	found	justified	in	her	criminal	
breach	is	not	the	same	as	the	outcome	of	a	trial	in	which	she	is	merely	excused	for	
having	performed	such	an	act.16		While	the	defendant	avoids	public	condemnation	
and	punishment	in	both	cases,	in	the	former	she	does	so	because	the	state	
determines	that	she	did	not	act	wrongly	in	virtue	of	disobeying	the	law;	at	least	in	
this	respect	she	did	not	err	or	make	a	mistake	in	practical	reasoning.		In	contrast,	in	
a	case	where	the	defendant	qualifies	only	for	an	excuse	the	state	finds	that	she	erred	
in	not	taking	the	criminal	prohibition	as	an	undefeated	reason	for	action,	or	as	
excluding	the	reason	on	which	she	acted,	and	while	it	does	not	fault	her	for	doing	so	
it	nevertheless	finds	her	practical	reasoning	deficient;	that	is,	it	judges	her	to	have	
come	up	short	as	a	rational	agent.		Gardner	rightly	emphasizes	that	we	care	about	
this	difference,	and	Brownlee	explicitly	concurs.17		In	responding	to	an	accusation	of	
wrongdoing	we	would	rather	demonstrate	that	our	conduct	was	justified	than	that	
it	was	excused	because	the	latter	involves	conceding	a	rational	failure,	a	failure	to	
act	on	the	reasons	on	which	we	ought	to	have	acted.		No	self-respecting	person	
																																																								
16	Gardner	132-33	
17	Gardner	(2007:	133-4).		Brownlee	writes	“…	we	not	only	want	to	assert	our	basic	responsibility	if	
we	take	ourselves	seriously,	but	have	an	interest	in	asserting	it	as	reasoning	beings”	and	that	
“according	to	this	Aristotelian	picture,	if	we	can,	we	give	a	justificatory	explanation	for	any	wrong	we	
do”	(2012:	161).	
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wants	to	be	a	failure.		This	is	likely	to	be	especially	true	of	the	conscientiously	
motivated	civil	disobedients	on	whose	behalf	Brownlee	argues	for	a	demands-of-
conviction	defense.		After	all,	she	maintains	that	a	sine	qua	non	of	those	who	disobey	
the	law	on	the	basis	of	conscientious	moral	convictions	is	that	“they	be	willing	to	
communicate	[their]	judgment	that	a	perceived	injustice	warrants	[their]	
opposition.”18		Surely	people	so	attuned	to	(what	they	perceive	to	be)	the	demands	
of	justice,	and	so	committed	to	realizing	it	that	they	risk	the	various	official	and	
unofficial	sanctions	that	typically	attach	to	violation	of	the	law,	will	be	the	kind	of	
people	to	whom	it	matters	a	great	deal	whether	they	are,	and	are	publicly	judged	to	
be,	justified	or	only	excused	for	their	criminal	breaches.19		Moreover,	it	should	
matter	to	us	whether	conscientiously	motivated	civil	disobedients	merit	a	
justificatory	defense	or	an	excuse,	since	we	ought	to	strive	to	hold	people	
responsible	only	for	that	for	which	they	are	responsible,	whether	it	be	doing	no	
wrong	in	virtue	of	performing	a	criminally	prohibited	act	or	only	not	being	at	fault	
for	doing	so.			
In	offering	a	justificatory	defense	for	her	criminal	breach,	a	defendant	
concedes	that	she	performed	a	token	of	a	type	of	act	prohibited	by	the	criminal	law	
but	maintains	that	she	was	not	wrong	to	do	so.		How	can	that	be?		If	she	committed	
the	criminal	offense	then	how	can	her	act	not	be	wrong?		The	answer,	I	submit,	is	
																																																								
18	Brownlee	(2012:	160).	
19	This	is	not	to	deny	that	civil	disobedients	may	care	more	about	correcting	the	perceived	injustice	
they	oppose	than	their	own	treatment	at	the	state’s	hands.		But	the	fact	that	on	the	basis	of	strategic	
considerations	a	civil	disobedient	may	pursue	an	excusatory	defense	rather	than	a	justificatory	one	
(e.g.	couch	her	defense	in	terms	of	blameless	wrongdoing	rather	than	in	terms	of	having	committed	
no	wrong)	does	not	entail	that	she	does	not	care	whether	others	think	her	criminal	breach	justifiable	
or	merely	excusable.	
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that	justificatory	defenses	purport	to	identify	cases	in	which	the	state	lacks	
authority	vis-à-vis	the	defendant;	that	is,	cases	in	which	agents	do	not	have	a	duty	to	
obey	the	law.		As	I	will	explain,	defendants	may	contest	the	law’s	authority	with	
respect	to	their	performance	of	a	particular	act	in	one	of	two	ways.		Either	they	may	
argue	that	in	cases	like	the	one	in	question	the	law	does	not	serve	to	enhance	its	
subjects’	conformity	to	right	reason,	or	they	may	argue	that	respect	for	their	
autonomy	precludes	the	state	from	requiring	them	to	defer	to	its	action-guiding	
judgments	vis-à-vis	the	act-type	in	question.		Before	turning	to	the	kind	of	
arguments	defendants	may	offer	as	legal	justifications	for	their	criminal	breaches,	
however,	I	want	to	emphasize	the	nature	of	the	claim	they	make.		Contrary	to	
Brownlee	(and	to	Gardner,	on	whose	account	of	defenses	she	relies),	justificatory	
legal	defenses	need	not	be	all	things	considered	justifications,	understood	as	a	
demonstration	that	one	acted	for	an	undefeated	reason.20		Rather,	justificatory	legal	
defenses	speak	only	to	the	reasons	for	action	an	agent	has	qua	legal	subject.		If	
successful,	what	they	demonstrate	is	that	an	agent	did	no	wrong	in	virtue	of	
performing	a	criminally	proscribed	act	as	such.		Since	the	law	enjoyed	no	legitimate	
claim	to	authority	over	her	with	respect	to	the	particular	act	she	performed,	the	
defendant	did	not	act	wrongly	by	failing	to	defer	to	the	law’s	judgment	as	expressed	
by	the	criminal	prohibition	on	the	performance	of	such	acts.		Note,	however,	that	a	
successful	justificatory	legal	defense	does	not	cancel	all	of	the	reasons	that	count	
against	the	performance	of	the	act	the	agent	performed.		Therefore	even	a	successful	
justificatory	legal	defense	leaves	open	the	possibility	that,	in	acting	as	she	did,	the	
																																																								
20	Brownlee	(2012:	162);	Gardner	(2007:	97).	
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agent	not	only	acted	wrongly	but	without	an	all	things	considered	justification	for	
her	conduct.21			
The	foregoing	analysis	of	justificatory	legal	defenses	employs	the	account	of	
law	and	legal	authority	developed	by	Joseph	Raz,	one	that	Brownlee	appears	to	
endorse.22		On	that	account,	law	necessarily	claims	authority	over	all	those	within	its	
jurisdiction.		Its	claim	is	justified,	or	the	law	enjoys	legitimate	authority	vis-à-vis	a	
particular	subject,	only	if	“the	subject	would	better	conform	to	the	reasons	that	
apply	to	him	anyway	(that	is,	to	reasons	other	than	the	directives	of	the	authority)	if	
he	intends	to	be	guided	by	the	authority’s	directives	than	if	he	does	not…	[and]	the	
matters	regarding	which	the	first	condition	is	met	are	such	that	with	respect	to	
them	it	is	better	to	conform	to	reason	than	to	decide	for	oneself,	unaided	by	
authority…”23		Where	these	conditions	are	met,	the	law	typically	provides	its	
subjects	with	protected	reasons	for	action;	first	order	reasons	to	perform	(or	not	
perform)	certain	acts	together	with	second-order	reasons	not	to	consider	certain	
other	first-order	reasons	against	performing	(or	not	performing)	those	acts.		
Rational	actors,	by	which	again	I	mean	ones	who	are	properly	responsive	to	
reasons,	ought	to	act	on	the	basis	of	such	reasons	when	they	apply	to	them,	i.e.	when	
the	law	enjoys	legitimate	authority	over	them.		Where	the	independent	reasons	
responsiveness	to	which	the	law	serves	to	enhance	are	moral	ones,	the	rational	
																																																								
21	The	phrasing	of	this	sentence	reflects	my	acceptance	arguendo	of	Brownlee’s	and	Gardner’s	view	
that	one	may	be	justified	in	acting	wrongly.		See	Brownlee	(2012:	161-2);	Gardner	(2007:	77-82;	95-
103).	
22	Brownlee	(2012:	99-100).		Gardner	(2007:	104-7)	employs	this	account	as	well.	
23	Raz	(2006:	1014).	
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requirement	to	defer	to	the	law’s	judgment	can	be	characterized	as	a	moral	duty	to	
obey	the	law.							
Justificatory	criminal	defenses,	recall,	purport	to	demonstrate	that	an	agent	
did	not	act	wrongly	in	failing	to	defer	to	the	law’s	judgment	that	she	ought	not	to	
perform	the	act	she	did.		Given	Raz’s	account	of	the	conditions	for	law’s	legitimate	
authority,	one	way	defendant’s	can	attempt	to	justify	their	criminal	conduct	is	by	
demonstrating	that	in	situations	like	those	in	which	the	agent	acted	the	law’s	
subjects	will	generally	do	better	at	acting	on	the	“reasons	that	apply	to	them	
anyway”	if	they	act	on	their	own	judgment	regarding	what	they	have	undefeated	
reason	to	do	than	if	they	defer	to	the	law’s	judgment.		Perhaps	the	best	and	probably	
the	most	common	way	to	make	a	case	for	this	conclusion	is	to	argue	that	had	those	
who	formulated	the	law	been	cognizant	of	situations	like	the	one	in	which	the	
defendant	acted,	they	would	have	changed	their	formulation	so	as	not	to	preclude	
the	defendant	acting	as	she	did	for	the	reasons	that	she	did.		While	legal	officials	
may	find	such	arguments	most	persuasive	when	they	judge	the	agent	in	question	to	
have	acted	for	a	reason	that	was	undefeated	(apart	from	the	criminal	law	whose	
authoritativeness	is	at	issue),	this	is	not	a	necessary	condition	for	the	success	of	
such	arguments,	either	in	persuading	legal	officials	or	on	their	merits.		Rather,	all	the	
defendant	need	establish	is	that	she	(and	by	extension,	other	similarly	situated	
individuals)	was	in	a	better	position	to	ascertain	what	she	had	reason	to	do	than	
was	the	law.	
A	second	way	in	which	defendants	can	attempt	to	legally	justify	their	
criminal	conduct	is	to	argue	that	they	had	a	moral	right	to	act	as	they	did.		As	Raz’s	
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analysis	of	the	conditions	under	which	law	enjoys	legitimate	authority	suggests,	in	
some	cases	it	may	be	more	important	that	an	agent	act	on	her	own	judgment	than	
that	she	judge	correctly,	i.e.	act	for	an	undefeated	reason.		Such	a	claim	stands	in	
need	of	defense,	of	course,	and	I	argue	in	the	next	section	that	Brownlee	offers	a	
compelling	one,	at	least	for	acts	of	civil	disobedience	as	she	characterizes	them.			
Here,	however,	I	simply	assume	the	justifiability	of	autonomy-protecting	rights	so	as	
to	focus	on	the	form	of	the	defendant’s	justificatory	argument.		In	asserting	in	a	
court	of	law	that	she	has	a	moral	right	to	perform	the	particular	law-violating	act	
she	performed,	a	defendant	makes	her	case	not	on	the	merits	of	her	conduct	but	by	
challenging	the	law’s	normative	jurisdiction	over	her;	i.e.	the	justifiability	of	its	claim	
to	authority	over	her	vis-à-vis	the	particular	act	she	performed.		In	evaluating	her	
argument,	and	so	considering	whether	to	grant	her	a	justificatory	legal	defense,	the	
court	need	not	and	perhaps	should	not	consider	whether	her	conduct	was	justified	
all	things	considered	(i.e.	whether	she	acted	for	an	undefeated	reason).		Rather,	it	
should	ask	whether	the	defendant	actually	enjoys	the	right	she	claims,	and	if	so,	
whether	her	conduct	fell	within	the	scope	of	that	right.		Affirmative	answers	to	these	
two	questions	provide	a	defeasible	justification	for	her	criminal	conduct,	a	
defeasible	claim	to	have	done	nothing	wrong	merely	in	virtue	of	having	chosen	to	do	
what	was	criminally	prohibited.		The	justification	is	only	defeasible	because,	as	I	
noted	in	the	introduction	to	this	essay,	considerations	such	as	those	related	to	the	
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institutionalizing	of	such	a	defense	may	entail	that	all	things	considered	the	law	may	
justifiably	refuse	to	recognize	the	right	in	question	by	granting	a	legal	defense.24	
	 Justificatory	legal	defenses,	then,	are	not	complete	rational	justifications	for	
criminal	conduct;	that	is,	they	do	not	show	that	the	defendant	acted	for	an	
undefeated	reason.		Rather,	legal	justifications	provide	what	Gardner	labels	
cancelling	permissions.25		In	granting	a	justificatory	legal	defense,	the	law	cancels	a	
reason	the	defendant	would	otherwise	have	not	to	perform	a	particular	act	(for	
certain	reasons),	namely	that	she	has	a	legal	duty	not	to	do	so.		In	doing	so,	the	state	
renders	it	permissible	for	its	subjects	to	perform	particular	criminal	acts	for	
particular	reasons,	though	it	does	not	provide	them	with	a	reason	to	do	so.		While	
this	description	may	suggest	otherwise,	the	court	does	not	make	an	act	justified	
after	the	fact	(except,	perhaps,	in	the	first	instance	in	which	a	defense	is	granted,	in	
which	case	the	court	makes	or	modifies	the	law,	rather	than	applying	or	interpreting	
it);	rather,	the	law	considers	whether	the	agent	had	a	legal	justificatory	defense	for	
his	criminal	conduct	at	the	time	he	performed	the	act	in	question.	
Whereas	defendants	who	offer	a	justificatory	legal	defense	for	their	criminal	
conduct	maintain	that	they	did	no	wrong	in	failing	to	treat	as	authoritative	a	
																																																								
24	Brownlee	(2012:	123-4)	notes	that	it	would	be	paradoxical	for	the	law	to	recognize	the	moral	right	
to	civil	disobedience,	i.e.	to	conscientious	communicative	disobedience	to	the	law,	by	translating	it	
into	a	legal	right.		After	all,	were	there	a	legal	right	to	deliberately	break	the	law	in	order	to	
communicate	one’s	conscientious	convictions,	such	acts	would	not	actually	count	as	illegal.		The	
foregoing	analysis	of	justificatory	legal	defenses	shows	how	the	law	may	recognize	a	moral	right	to	
conscientious	action	that	includes	civil	disobedience	without	generating	this	paradox.		Acts	for	which	
a	person	enjoys	a	justificatory	legal	defense	are	illegal;	that	is,	they	are	tokens	of	an	act	type	
proscribed	by	a	criminal	offense	definition.		But	they	are	not	wrongful	because	the	criminal	norm	in	
question	is	not	authoritative	vis-à-vis	the	actor	in	question	in	the	circumstances	in	which	she	acted.		
As	I	argue	below,	in	the	case	of	civil	disobedience	the	explanation	for	the	norm’s	lack	of	authority	lies	
in	the	actor’s	moral	right	to	conscientious	action.	
25	Gardner	(2007:	106-7).	
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particular	criminal	prohibition,	those	who	offer	a	legal	excuse	concede	that	they	
ought	to	have	recognized	the	criminal	law’s	authority	but	argue	that	they	should	not	
be	blamed	or	faulted	for	their	failure	to	do	so.		More	precisely,	those	who	offer	a	
legal	excuse	admit	to	an	error	in	practical	reasoning,	a	failure	either	to	advert	to	all	
and	only	those	reasons	that	applied	to	them,	or	to	properly	integrate	the	protected	
reason	provided	by	a	particular	criminal	norm	into	their	deliberation.		I	focus	here	
on	shortcomings	in	integration.26		Reasons	are	properly	integrated	into	an	agent’s	
deliberation	when	they	function	correctly,	defeating	(outweighing)	or	excluding	all	
and	only	the	other	reasons	that	they	do,	in	fact,	defeat	or	exclude.		Failures	of	
integration	occur	when	reasons	do	not	function	correctly	in	an	agent’s	deliberation;	
for	example,	when	an	agent	does	not	take	a	reason	to	exclude	or	defeat	some	other	
reason	that	it	does,	in	fact,	exclude	or	defeat.		In	slightly	less	jargon-filled	terms,	
defendants	who	seek	an	excusatory	defense	concede	that	the	law	provided	them	
with	a	reason	not	to	perform	the	act	they	did,	at	least	for	the	reasons	that	moved	
them	to	perform	it,	and	that	they	erred	in	failing	to	respond	properly	to	that	reason.		
Nevertheless	they	contend	that	their	error	was	reasonable,	where	that	means	that	in	
reasoning	as	they	did	they	lived	up	to	our	justifiable	normative	expectations	of	
them.	
So	defined,	the	category	of	legal	excuse	encompasses	a	far	smaller	class	of	
arguments	than	often	fall	under	that	heading	in	criminal	law	textbooks	or	in	certain	
philosophical	accounts	of	legal	excuse.		Construed	narrowly,	as	I	follow	Gardner	in	
																																																								
26	R.A.	Duff	(2007:	263-98)	distinguishes	faultless	failures	to	advert	to	reasons	that	apply	to	one,	
which	he	labels	unjustified	but	warranted,	from	faultless	failures	of	deliberation,	which	he	labels	
excuses.		Gardner	(2007:	86-7)	groups	both	types	of	shortcomings	under	the	heading	of	excuses.		
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doing	here,	excuses	are	distinct	from	denials	of	responsibility	(i.e.	arguments	that	
deny	a	defendant’s	status	as	a	responsible	agent,	such	as	the	insanity	defense)	and	
failures	of	proof	(i.e.	arguments	that	deny	the	attribution	to	the	defendant	of	the	act	
specified	in	the	criminal	offense	definition,	as	in	some	mistake	of	fact	defenses).		In	
presenting	Gardner’s	account	of	defenses,	on	the	basis	of	which	she	argues	for	a	
demands-of-conviction	excusatory	defense,	Brownlee	focuses	on	Gardner’s	claim	
that	“the	paradigm	excuse	is	that	one	had	a	justified	belief	in	justification”	though	
one	did	not,	in	fact,	have	a	justification	for	acting	as	one	did.27		In	a	legal	context,	at	
least,	this	claim	sweeps	too	broadly,	since	it	fails	to	distinguish	excuses	from	failures	
of	proof.		While	both	involve	a	defendant’s	claim	to	have	been	justified	in	forming	
and	acting	on	what	was	actually	a	false	belief,	failure	of	proof	arguments	do	so	in	
order	to	contest	the	attribution	of	norm-violating	conduct	to	the	agent,	while	
excuses	do	so	in	order	to	contest	the	claim	that	the	agent	was	at	fault	for	her	
violation	of	the	norm.		A	better	starting	point	for	an	analysis	of	legal	excuses	
(narrowly	construed)	is	with	Gardner’s	statement	in	an	eponymous	article	that	“the	
gist	of	an	excuse…	is	precisely	that	the	person	with	the	excuse	lived	up	to	our	
[normative]	expectations.”28		To	offer	a	complete	excuse	for	one’s	criminal	conduct,	
say	by	arguing	that	one	acted	under	duress	or	that	one	was	provoked,	is	to	maintain	
that	there	is	an	explanation	for	one’s	faulty	practical	reasoning	that	shows	one	to	
have	met	the	law’s	reasonable	or	justifiable	expectations	regarding	responsiveness	
to	reasons	that	apply	to	one	in	the	circumstances	in	which	one	acted.		These	last	
																																																								
27	Brownlee	(2012:	163).	
28	Gardner	(2007:	124).	
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qualifications	highlight	the	normative	component	of	the	standards	against	which	an	
agent’s	responsiveness	to	reasons	is	measured;	for	example,	we	justifiably	demand	
that	police	officers	display	greater	fortitude	in	the	face	of	threats	of	bodily	harm	
than	we	do	of	ordinary	citizens.29		Since	a	defendant	with	a	complete	excuse	meets	
the	law’s	reasonable	or	justifiable	expectations	of	her,	it	has	no	desert-based	
grounds	on	which	to	find	her	at	fault	for	her	violation	of	the	law,	let	alone	for	
punishing	her,	even	though	she	failed	to	properly	integrate	the	criminal	prohibition	
on	acts	of	the	type	she	performed	into	her	deliberation.		Of	course,	in	the	context	of	
a	legal	excuse	the	law’s	reasonable	expectations	of	its	subjects	cannot	simply	be	that	
they	respond	appropriately	to	the	reasons	for	action	with	which	it	provides	them.		
Rather,	with	respect	to	excuses	I	contend	that	the	law’s	reasonable	expectations	
concern	the	concessions	it	makes	to	human	imperfection	or	frailty,	including	
(though	perhaps	not	limited	to)	certain	errors	or	malfunctions	in	practical	
reasoning	for	which	we	ought	not	to	hold	agents	responsible.		For	example,	a	
defendant	who	claims	duress	as	an	excuse	admits	her	responsibility	for	the	
commission	of	the	crime,	its	attribution	to	her	qua	rational	agent.		She	acted	for	a	
reason	she	mistakenly	took	to	be	undefeated.		What	she	denies	is	that	she	ought	to	
be	held	responsible	for	the	fact	that	her	fear	of	another’s	threat	led	her	to	
erroneously	treat	as	undefeated	the	reason	on	which	she	acted.			
In	a	legal	context,	the	term	‘excuse’	applies	only	to	cases	in	which	a	defendant	
can	point	to	a	defect	in	practical	reasoning	for	which	she	ought	not	to	be	held	
responsible	as	a	complete	defense	for	her	criminal	conduct.		In	non-legal	contexts,	
																																																								
29	See	Gardner	(2007:	129-30)	on	this	point.	
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however,	the	term	‘excuse’	applies	as	well	to	partial	defenses	for	norm-violating	
conduct.		In	such	cases,	we	recognize	the	degree	to	which	a	given	human	
imperfection	or	frailty	made	it	more	difficult	for	the	agent	in	question	to	respond	
appropriately	to	the	reasons	that	applied	to	her.		While	we	do	not	judge	the	level	of	
difficulty	to	have	been	so	great	that	we	think	it	unjustifiable	to	blame	her	at	all	for	
what	she	did,	neither	do	we	think	it	justifiable	to	blame	her	as	much	as	we	would	a	
person	who	made	the	same	error	in	practical	reasoning	without	being	subject	to	the	
challenges	to	reasoning	well	that	she	faced.		Of	course,	typically	some	degree	of	
difficulty	in	reasoning	well	due	to	particular	human	imperfections	will	not	excuse	at	
all.		This	person	to	whom	the	partially	excused	agent	is	judged	to	be	comparatively	
less	blameworthy	is	not	the	agent	who	faces	no	such	difficulty	at	all	(God,	perhaps?),	
but	a	person	who	acts	only	under	“normal”	challenges	to	reasoning	well.30		
Arguably,	in	at	least	some	jurisdictions	the	law	sometimes	recognizes	and	responds	
to	defendants’	partial	excuses	for	their	criminal	wrongdoing	by	charging	them	with	
a	lesser	offense	and/or	sentencing	them	to	a	lesser	punishment	than	it	might.		In	
doing	so,	legal	officials	recognize	that	when	conceived	of	as	a	blaming	response	
punishment	ought	to	be	doubly	proportionate:	first	to	the	moral	seriousness	of	the	
criminal	breach	the	defendant	performed,	and	second	to	the	extent	if	any	to	which	
																																																								
30	Horder	(2004:	8-9)	says	of	excuses	that	they	shine	a	positive	light	on	wrongdoing.		Though	it	may	
be	substantively	identical,	I	think	it	more	apt	to	say	that	excuses	show	the	performance	of	a	wrongful	
act,	and	so	the	agent	who	performed	it,	in	a	less	negative	light;	that	is,	they	show	her	failure	to	
respond	appropriately	to	reasons	to	be	a	lesser	shortcoming	than	it	would	be	had	she	not	been	
subject	to	the	human	imperfections	or	frailties	that	led	her	to	reason	poorly.	
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she	ought	to	be	excused	for	doing	so.		Strictly	speaking,	however,	partial	excuses	do	
not	provide	a	person	accused	of	a	crime	with	a	criminal	defense.31	
In	this	section	I	have	sought	to	characterize	the	precise	nature	of	the	
response	to	an	accusation	of	criminal	wrongdoing	a	defendant	makes	when	she	
offers	either	a	justificatory	or	excusatory	defense	for	her	breach	of	the	criminal	law.		
Legal	justifications	purport	to	demonstrate	that	the	defendant	did	nothing	wrong	in	
virtue	of	her	violation	of	the	particular	criminal	prohibition	she	breached;	that	is,	
she	did	not	act	wrongly	in	failing	to	treat	that	prohibition	as	authoritative,	as	
providing	her	with	a	protected	reason	for	action.		Legal	excuses,	narrowly	
construed,	purport	to	demonstrate	that	the	law	ought	not	to	fault	the	defendant	for	
her	failure	to	properly	integrate	a	particular	criminal	prohibition	into	her	
deliberation,	and	so	for	choosing	to	act	in	violation	of	it.		It	should	not	do	so	because	
the	defendant	met	our	reasonable	expectations	for	people	like	her	in	situations	like	
the	one	in	which	she	broke	the	law,	expectations	that	reflect	concessions	the	law	
ought	to	make	to	human	frailty.		With	this	understanding	of	justificatory	and	
excusatory	legal	defenses	in	hand,	I	now	consider	whether,	and	when,	a	just	state	
ought	to	recognize	such	defenses	for	those	who	commit	conscientiously	motivated	
acts	of	disobedience	to	law.		
III	
																																																								
31	Note	that	partial	excuses	are	not	the	only	grounds	a	court	may	have	to	mitigate	the	punishment	it	
assigns	a	particular	defendant.		Rather,	partial	excuses	constitute	reasons	the	law	ought	to	take	into	
account	insofar	as	it	aims	to	engage	with	her	as	a	responsible	agent,	i.e.	to	give	her	what	she	
deserves.	
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	 Brownlee	maintains	that	those	who	perform	conscientiously	motivated	
communicative	acts	of	disobedience	to	law	have	a	prima	facie	claim	to	the	state’s	
excusing	their	criminal	conduct.		Though	this	may	be	true	in	a	few	cases,	I	will	now	
demonstrate	that	that	Brownlee’s	arguments	actually	support	a	demands-of-
conviction	justificatory	defense,	not	the	excusatory	one	she	explicitly	sets	out	to	
defend.		Since	as	self-respecting	responsible	agents	we	aim	to	justify	our	conduct	if	
we	can	and	to	offer	an	excuse	for	it	only	if	we	must,	this	conclusion	marks	an	
important	correction	to	Brownlee’s	account	of	the	rejoinder	civil	disobedients	may	
give	in	response	to	a	charge	of	criminal	wrongdoing.		Moreover,	this	correction	
creates	the	conceptual	space	necessary	to	argue,	contra	Browlee,	that	even	when	
conscientiously	motivated	disobedients	to	law	ought	to	be	punished	for	their	
criminal	conduct	they	may	still	have	a	prima	facie	claim	to	mitigated	punishment	as	
a	matter	of	justice	and	not	merely	mercy.	
Brownlee	argues	that	both	respect	for	autonomy	and	sensitivity	to	the	
psychological	injuries	a	person	is	likely	to	suffer	should	she	conform	to	the	law	at	
the	cost	of	betraying	her	deeply	held	moral	commitments	ground	a	demands-of-
conviction	defense.		Consider,	first,	the	argument	from	respect	for	autonomy.		
Echoing	Horder,	Brownlee	maintains	that	were	the	law	to	insist	that	its	subjects	
always	compromise	their	moral	convictions	when	adherence	to	them	conflicts	with	
conformity	to	the	law	it	would	unduly	affect	their	prospects	for	realizing	full	
personal	autonomy.32		The	state	has	a	moral	duty	not	to	impose	such	a	demand	
upon	them,	one	that	correlates	to	their	moral	right	to	act	in	ways	expressive	of	their	
																																																								
32	Brownlee	(2012:	167);	Horder	(2004:	199-200).	
	 25	
conscientious	convictions.		So,	suppose	a	person	trespasses	for	the	purpose	of	
expressing	her	conscientious	moral	conviction	that	a	particular	law	or	policy	is	
unjust.		The	argument	from	autonomy	implies	that	when	brought	before	a	court	of	
law	she	should	offer	in	her	defense	not	simply	the	particular	conviction	that	
motivated	her	illegal	act	but	her	right	as	a	“reasoning	and	feeling	being	capable	of	
forming	deep	moral	commitments”	to	act	on	her	conviction	even,	within	certain	
limits,	when	that	involves	violating	the	law.		As	I	argued	in	the	preceding	section,	
however,	to	do	so	is	to	offer	a	justificatory	defense	for	her	criminal	conduct.		It	is	to	
meet	the	law’s	accusation	of	criminal	wrongdoing	by	arguing	that	she	had	no	duty	to	
treat	the	criminal	norm	she	violated	as	authoritative,	or	more	precisely	as	not	
excluding	the	performance	of	conscientiously	motivated	communicative	acts	of	
disobedience	to	that	law.			
Of	course,	a	civil	disobedient	will	almost	certainly	believe	that	her	criminal	
conduct	was	justified	all	things	considered.		That	is,	she	will	likely	believe	that	her	
illegal	act	was	not	wrong	all	things	considered,	and	not	merely	that	it	was	not	wrong	
in	virtue	of	being	a	violation	of	the	law	though	wrong	for	some	other	reason.33		We	
all	aspire	to	act	for	undefeated	reasons,	after	all,	which	is	just	what	it	means	to	say	
that	our	conduct	is	justified	all	things	considered.		Given	this	aspiration,	it	should	
come	as	no	surprise	that	when	civil	disobedients	defend	their	criminal	conduct,	
																																																								
33	That	someone	might	make	the	latter	claim	may	sound	odd.		Consider,	however,	the	possibility	that	
in	the	interval	between	when	she	performed	the	act	in	question	and	when	she	goes	to	trial	for	it	the	
agent	may	conclude	that	she	ought	not	to	have	acted	as	she	did	because	the	moral	or	prudential	
reasons	that	applied	to	her	left	her	with	no	undefeated	reason	for	so	acting.		I	ought	not	to	have	done	
it,	she	may	concede,	but	not	because	it	was	illegal.		Intriguingly,	such	an	agent	may	have	a	
justification	for	her	violation	of	the	law,	but	at	most	only	an	excuse	for	her	violation	of	some	other	
norm	she	also	breached	in	acting	as	she	did.	
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whether	in	a	court	of	law,	in	the	media,	or	in	private	conversation	they	oftentimes	
attempt	to	show	that	it	was	justified	all	things	considered.		At	least	in	a	liberal	state,	
though,	the	law	does	not	concern	itself	with	whether	its	subjects	act	justifiably	all	
things	considered	but	only	with	whether	they	respond	properly	to	the	reasons	for	
action	it	provides	them.		So	while	the	civil	disobedient	may	want	to	vindicate	her	
violation	of	the	law	by	showing	that	it	was	justified	all	things	considered,	all	she	
need	do	to	respond	to	a	criminal	charge	is	argue	that	her	act	was	not	unjustified	
because	it	was	a	breach	of	the	criminal	law.				
Brownlee’s	attempt	to	justify	a	demands-of-conviction	defense	for	criminal	
conduct	by	appeal	to	the	psychological	costs	that	conformity	to	the	law	can	impose	
also	reads	better	as	an	argument	for	a	justificatory	defense	than	as	an	argument	for	
an	excusatory	one.		She	writes	that	the	law’s	demand	that	in	cases	of	conflict	fidelity	
to	it	always	take	priority	over	loyalty	to	her	moral	convictions	might	well	threaten	
an	agent’s	integrity,	leave	her	alienated	from	the	life	she	lives,	and	subject	to	
frequent	weakness	of	the	will.34		These	setbacks	to	an	agent’s	psychological	health	
are	deeply	problematic	both	in	their	own	right	and	in	terms	of	their	contribution	to	
an	agent’s	autonomy.		With	regard	to	the	latter,	Brownlee	rightly	points	out	that	“in	
valuing	autonomy,	it	is	necessary	to	value	also	the	conditions	for	autonomy,	one	of	
which	is	an	integrated	mind	and	the	capacity	for	practical	reasoning.”35		If	valuing	
the	conditions	for	autonomy	is	part	of	what	is	involved	in	valuing	autonomy,	and	if	
properly	valuing	an	agent’s	autonomy	requires	recognizing	her	right	to	
																																																								
34	Brownlee	(2012:	168).	
35	Brownlee	(2012:	168).	
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conscientious	action,	then	valuing	the	conditions	for	autonomy	requires	recognizing	
a	right	to	conscientious	action.		As	should	now	be	clear,	however,	a	civil	disobedient	
who	employs	this	chain	of	reasoning	to	respond	to	a	criminal	charge	offers	a	
justificatory	defense	of	her	illegal	conduct.		In	cases	where	obedience	to	law	
threatens	to	seriously	damage	an	agent’s	ability	to	act	autonomously,	it	may	
sometimes	be	more	important	from	a	moral	standpoint	that	she	act	on	her	own	
judgment	of	what	she	ought	to	do	than	that	she	defer	to	the	law’s	judgment,	even	if	
her	judgment	is	mistaken	while	the	law’s	is	not.		If	it	can	do	so	without	unduly	
burdening	others,	i.e.	unjustifiably	violating	or	failing	to	protect	their	moral	rights,	
then	the	state	should	tolerate	conscientiously	motivated	criminal	conduct	so	as	to	
refrain	from	injuring	the	psychological	capacities	that	are	conditions	for	civil	
disobedients’	autonomy.	
Brownlee	also	offers	as	a	reason	for	the	law	to	acknowledge	a	demands-of-
conviction	defense	“the	psychological	importance,	distinct	from	autonomy,	of	our	
not	always	having	to	give	priority	to	literal	adherence	with	the	law	over	our	own	
beliefs	and	commitments”	(Brownlee,	168).		I	am	not	entirely	clear	on	what	
Brownlee	has	in	mind	here,	but	one	plausible	basis	for	this	psychological	
importance	is	the	phenomenological	suffering	that	normally	accompanies	the	
experience	of	alienation	or	weakness	of	the	will.		Might	a	conscientiously	motivated	
law-breaker	offer	the	suffering	she	risked	were	she	to	have	obeyed	the	law	she	
breached	as	an	independent	basis	for	a	justificatory	defense	of	her	criminal	
conduct?		It	depends	on	whether	the	interest	people	have	in	being	free	from	the	
suffering	that	typically	characterizes	the	aforementioned	psychological	harms	is	
	 28	
weighty	enough	to	generate	a	prima	facie	right	against	the	state	that	it	not	impose	
upon	them	the	risk	of	suffering	such	harms.36		If	people	have	such	an	interest,	then	
like	the	interest	in	autonomy	it	can	serve	to	define	a	domain	of	conduct	in	which	it	is	
more	important	that	people	act	on	their	own	judgment,	i.e.	that	they	conform	to	
their	conscientiously	held	but	possibly	mistaken	moral	convictions,	than	that	they	
defer	to	the	law’s	authority	(even	where	doing	so	would	enable	them	to	better	act	
on	the	reasons	that	truly	apply	to	them).		That	is,	the	right	in	question	would	
provide	a	basis	for	a	justificatory	defense	for	conscientiously	motivated	criminal	
breaches	that	fell	within	the	scope	of	the	right	to	conscientious	action.			
Do	people	have	an	interest	in	freedom	from	the	suffering	concomitant	with	
alienation	and	akrasia	weighty	enough	to	ground	a	right,	a	prima	facie	claim	at	least	
against	the	state	that	it	refrain	from	exposing	them	to	a	significant	risk	of	it	by	
requiring	obedience	to	its	laws	whenever	they	conflict	with	a	person’s	conscientious	
convictions?		I	am	of	two	minds.		On	the	one	hand,	to	maintain	that	such	a	right	
exists	is	to	argue	that	the	avoidance	of	personal	suffering	sometimes	entails	not	only	
a	right	to	do	wrong	but	also	a	right	to	act	on	what	is	actually	a	defeated	reason.37		
Such	a	claim	might	be	rejected	on	the	grounds	that	people	only	have	a	right	not	to	
suffer	unjustly,	and	that	insofar	as	conscientiously	motivated	disobedients	to	law	
would	actually	do	better	at	acting	on	the	reasons	that	apply	to	them	by	conforming	
to	the	law	than	by	acting	on	their	own	judgment,	the	suffering	that	will	follow	if	they	
conform	to	the	law	may	be	unfortunate	but	it	is	not	unjust.		Or	at	least	this	
																																																								
36	Brownlee	(2012:	120-1)	explicitly	adopts	an	interest	theory	of	rights.	
37	As	in	the	previous	section	I	put	the	point	this	way	because	Brownlee	maintains	that	acts	can	be	
wrong	but	justified	all	things	considered;	i.e.	done	for	an	undefeated	reason.	
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conclusion	holds	in	cases	where	the	reasons	to	which	the	agent’s	conformity	is	
enhanced	by	deference	to	the	law	are	moral	obligations	or	duties.		On	the	other	
hand,	if	an	agent’s	interest	in	autonomy	can	ground	a	right	to	do	wrong,	it	is	not	
obvious	why	the	interest	in	not	suffering	the	injuries	Brownlee	posits	cannot	also	do	
so.		Brownlee	holds	that	“the	moral	rights	arising	from	moral	conviction	are	rooted	
in	the	principle	of	humanism”38	which,	recall,	holds	that	“society	has	a	duty	to	honor	
the	fact	that	we	are	reasoning	and	feeling	beings	capable	of	forming	deep	moral	
commitments.”39		Perhaps	the	duty	to	honor	people	as	feeling	beings	indicates	that	
people’s	interest	in	not	experiencing	the	phenomenological	suffering	characteristic	
of	alienation	and	akrasia	is	weighty	enough	to	provide	an	independent	ground	for	a	
moral	right	to	conscientious	action	that	can	underpin	a	justificatory	defense	for	
certain	criminal	breaches.		In	practice	resolving	this	dispute	may	well	prove	
unnecessary,	since	it	seems	likely	that	any	case	where	the	law	imposes	on	a	civil	
disobedient	a	significant	risk	of	experiencing	the	phenomenological	suffering	that	
typically	accompanies	alienation	and	akrasia	will	also	be	one	in	which	it	threatens	
her	full	realization	of	personal	autonomy.		Moreover,	even	if	the	phenomenological	
suffering	likely	to	accompany	fidelity	to	law	at	the	expense	of	loyalty	to	deeply	held	
moral	convictions	does	not	provide	a	justificatory	legal	defense	for	an	agent’s	
criminal	breach	it	may	still	legally	excuse	it,	warrant	a	lesser	punishment,	or	provide	
a	reason	for	the	state	to	treat	her	mercifully.40	
																																																								
38	Brownlee	(2012:	120).	
39	Brownlee	(2012:	7).	
40	I	touch	on	all	three	of	these	possibilities	below.	
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Reflection	on	the	nature	of	(legal)	excuses	further	supports	the	claim	that	the	
considerations	Brownlee	adumbrates	actually	support	a	demands-of-conviction	
justificatory	defense.		The	gist	of	an	excuse,	recall,	is	a	person’s	claim	to	have	lived	
up	to	our	reasonable	or	justifiable	expectations	of	her	as	a	rational	agent,	
expectations	regarding	her	attentiveness	to	reasons	and	her	integration	of	them	into	
her	practical	reasoning.		To	offer	an	excuse	for	one’s	unjustified	conduct	is	to	argue	
that	one	ought	not	to	be	held	responsible	for	shortcomings	in	these	respects.		If	true,	
this	claim	explains	why	one’s	act,	though	wrong,	does	not	reflect	poorly	on	one.		
Given	the	nature	of	excusatory	arguments,	and	her	desire	to	defend	a	demands-of-
conscience	excuse,	Brownlee	ought	to	explain	how	it	is	that	a	conscientiously	
motivated	law-breaker’s	moral	commitments	interfere	with	her	responsiveness	to	
the	reasons	that	apply	to	her,	and	why,	as	a	concession	to	human	imperfection	and	
frailty,	the	state	ought	not	to	hold	her	responsible	for	her	defective	practical	
reasoning.		She	does	nothing	of	the	sort,	however.		Instead,	Brownlee	appeals	to	the	
value	of	autonomy	and	freedom	from	psychological	injuries	such	as	alienation	and	
akrasia	as	reasons	for	the	law	to	honor	and	respect	its	subjects	by	acknowledging	a	
demands-of-conviction	defense.		But	as	I	have	now	argued	at	length,	the	claim	that	
people	have	an	interest	in	autonomy	(and	perhaps	also	in	psychological	well-being)	
sufficiently	weighty	or	valuable	to	ground	a	prima	facie	duty	on	the	state	not	
condemn	them	for	their	conscientiously	motivated	communicative	acts	of	
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disobedience	to	law	grounds	a	legal	justification	for	criminal	conduct,	not	an	
excuse.41	
Brownlee	herself	recognizes	the	justificatory	overtones	in	her	argument	for	a	
demands-of	-conviction	defense.		The	value	the	conscientiously	motivated	offender	
seeks	to	protect,	she	writes,	“include	the	genuine	value	of	her	autonomy,	agency,	
and	capacity	for	persistent	commitments,	which	together	may	seem	to	lend	a	
justificatory	gloss	to	what	would	otherwise	have	to	be	an	assertion	of	mere	
excusability.”42		Of	course,	a	successful	argument	for	a	demands-of-conviction	
defense	grounded	in	respect	for	the	conscientious	law-breaker’s	autonomy	must	
grapple	with	how	to	construe	its	value	in	cases	where	an	actor	chooses	to	act	
wrongly.		But	Brownlee	briefly	describes	several	plausible	answers	to	this	challenge,	
including	treating	autonomy	as	non-instrumentally	but	conditionally	valuable,	with	
the	condition	being	that	an	agent	choose	well,	or	less	demandingly,	that	she	not	
violate	others’	moral	rights.		Why,	then,	does	she	not	argue	for	a	demands-of-
conviction	justificatory	defense,	or	perhaps	more	accurately,	recognize	that	this	is	
the	conclusion	her	argument	warrants?		Perhaps	it	is	because	she	believes	that	only	
those	who	can	show	that	their	act	was	justified	all	things	considered	can	claim	a	
																																																								
41	The	passages	in	which	Brownlee	argues	for	a	demands-of-conviction	defense	include	only	a	single	
remark	that	connects	her	discussion	of	the	nature	of	excuses	with	her	claim	that,	all	else	equal,	
conscientiously	motivated	law-breakers	ought	to	be	legally	excused	for	their	communicative	acts	of	
disobedience	to	law.		In	characterizing	their	disobedience	to	law	as	an	“autonomous	act	taken	on	the	
strength	of	their	[conscientious]	commitments,”	Brownlee	writes,	such	actors	can	give	reasons	for	
mistakenly	believing	that	they	had	undefeated	reasons	to	act	as	they	did.		But	it	does	not	follow	that	
in	doing	so	these	actors	must	be	offering	an	excuse	for	their	criminal	conduct,	as	Brownlee	suggests.		
Rather,	they	may	wish	to	demonstrate	their	conscientious	motive	because	doing	so	is	necessary	to	
establish	that	they	acted	within	their	right	to	conscientious	action,	and	so	necessary	to	establishing	
that	they	were	justified	in	not	treating	the	particular	law	they	violated	as	authoritative.	
42	Brownlee	(2012:	166).	
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justificatory	legal	defense,	and	she	wishes	to	argue	that	conscientiously	motivated	
disobedients	to	law	are	entitled	to	a	legal	defense	even	in	some	range	of	cases	in	
which	their	conduct	is	not	justified	all	things	considered.		As	I	argued	in	the	previous	
section,	the	first	of	these	two	claims	is	mistaken.		Still,	it	does	offer	an	explanation	
for	the	surprising	fact	that	Brownlee	elects	to	argue	only	for	an	excusatory	defense	
on	behalf	of	conscientiously	motivated	disobedients	to	law.						
IV	
The	justificatory	defense	for	which	I	maintain	Brownlee	actually	argues	
extends	only	to	those	acts	that	fall	within	the	scope	of	an	agent’s	right	to	
conscientious	action.		What,	then,	of	conscientiously	motivated	acts	of	disobedience	
to	law	outside	the	scope	of	that	right,	or	at	least	ones	the	state	judges	to	be	outside	
the	scope	of	that	right?		Might	at	least	some	of	those	who	perform	such	acts	be	
legally	excused	for	doing	so?		I	think	the	answer	is	yes,	though	at	least	in	a	
moderately	just	legal	system	examples	may	be	few	and	far	between	even	before	we	
take	into	account	limits	on	the	recognition	of	a	legal	excuse	grounded	in	
considerations	other	than	the	agent’s	desert.		The	more	common	case	will	likely	be	
one	in	which	the	actor	who	performs	a	conscientiously	motivated	communicative	
breach	of	the	criminal	law	can	offer	a	partial	excuse	for	her	actions,	one	the	law	
ought	to	treat	as	presumptive	grounds	for	a	mitigated	sentence	(or,	if	possible,	
conviction	for	a	lesser	offense).	
An	agent’s	conscientiously	held	conviction	can	excuse	her	criminal	conduct	
only	if	it	causes	the	defect	in	practical	reasoning	that	leads	her	to	mistakenly	
conclude	that	she	has	an	undefeated	reason	to	perform	a	token	of	some	criminally	
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proscribed	act	type.		Jeremy	Horder	offers	one	such	example	in	his	discussion	of	
what	he	calls	a	demands-of-conscience	excuse,	namely	an	assisted	suicide	“mercy	
killing”	performed	as	a	result	of	“conscience-driven	emotional	difficulties.”43		The	
“emotional	pressure”	to	which	the	defendant	is	subject	prevents	her	from	
recognizing	or	responding	appropriately	to	the	law’s	proscription	of	such	acts	as	a	
reason	that	defeats	her	victim’s	repeated	request	for	assistance	in	taking	his	life.		As	
Horder	describes	the	case,	defendant	and	victim	have	been	married	for	fifty	years	
(in	virtue	of	which	I	take	it	he	means	to	imply	that	they	have	special	associative	
duties	to	one	another),	they	have	an	intimate	and	detailed	knowledge	of	the	
suffering	experienced	by	those	with	victim’s	incurable	disease,	and	each	has	
promised	to	assist	the	other	in	committing	suicide	should	either	ever	suffer	from	the	
disease	in	question.44		Moreover,	in	pressing	her	to	assist	him	in	ending	his	life,	the	
victim	implicitly	consents	to	her	doing	so.		In	short,	defendant	has	a	host	of	reasons	
to	assist	her	spouse	in	taking	his	own	life,	all	of	which	we	may	assume	he	has	
repeatedly	called	to	her	attention.		Suppose,	however,	that	all	of	these	reasons	are	
excluded	by	the	law’s	prohibition	on	intentionally	killing	(innocent)	people.		Assume	
that	defendant	has	a	reason	(indeed	a	duty)	not	to	kill	morally	innocent	people,	one	
that	defeats	her	reason	(perhaps	also	a	duty)	to	lessen	her	loved	one’s	suffering	and	
that	renders	null	the	putative	promissory	obligation	at	issue.		She	will	better	
conform	to	the	reasons	that	apply	to	her	in	this	case	by	deferring	to	the	law	rather	
than	acting	on	her	own	judgment,	colored	as	it	is	by	her	emotional	response	to	her	
																																																								
43	Horder	(2004:	225).	
44	Horder	(2004:	209).	
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spouse’s	plight.		Nevertheless,	I	believe	it	is	at	least	arguable	that	the	fortitude	to	
reason	well	in	these	circumstances	exceeds	what	we	may	reasonably	expect	of	the	
defendant.			That	is,	we	may	not	justifiably	demand	that,	when	deliberating	about	
whether	to	assist	her	dying	spouse	in	committing	suicide,	she	recognize	and	
respond	to	the	reason	the	law	gives	her	not	to	act	on	the	reasons	that	her	dying	
spouse	repeatedly	brings	to	her	attention.		If	so,	then	defendant	has	a	prima	facie	
claim	to	be	fully	excused	for	committing	the	crime	of	assisting	another	in	taking	his	
own	life.45	
	 	Brownlee	notes	that	concrete	examples	invite	nothing	but	controversy,	and	
no	doubt	that	is	true	of	the	foregoing	case.		Furthermore,	though	the	defendant’s	
deeply	held	commitments	may	account	for	her	failure	to	respond	appropriately	to	
the	law,	her	act	is	not	a	communicative	one	since	it	is	not	done	“either	in	order	to	
engage	others	or	because	the	act	will	engage	others	in	deliberation	about	the	merits	
of	the	cause.”46		But	that	is	all	the	more	reason	to	construe	the	act	as	(at	best)	
excusable,	and	perhaps	by	contrast	lend	credence	to	the	claim	that	we	ought	to	
construe	communicative	acts	of	disobedience	to	law	that	fall	within	the	scope	of	the	
right	to	conscientious	action	as	legally	justified.		In	fact,	the	suggestion	that	only	
conscientiously	motivated	communicative	disobedience	to	law	can	qualify	for	a	
justificatory	legal	defense,	while	only	conscientiously	motivated	non-communicative	
disobedience	to	law	can	qualify	for	an	excuse,	sheds	new	light	on	the	dispute	
																																																								
45	Horder	only	claims	that	the	defendant	is	entitled	to	a	partial	excuse	because	he	thinks	only	minor	
violations	of	individual	rights	can	be	fully	excused.	
46	Bronwlee	(2012:	160).		The	story	might	be	constructed	so	as	to	make	defendant’s	criminal	conduct	
evasive	or	non-evasive.	
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between	Horder	and	Brownlee	regarding	the	extension	of	a	demands-of-conviction	
defense	to	civil	disobedience.		The	primary	point	of	disagreement	between	them	
concerns	the	possibility	of	reconciling	a	moral	right	to	civil	disobedience	with	
legitimate	democratic	authority.		Brownlee	offers	a	compelling	rebuttal	to	those	like	
Horder	and	Raz	who	argue	that	no	such	reconciliation	is	possible.47		The	success	of	
her	argument	entails	that	civil	disobedients	have	a	prima	facie	claim	against	the	
state	that	it	neither	convict	nor	punish	them	for	criminal	conduct	that	falls	within	
their	right	to	civil	disobedience.		Horder	errs,	that	is,	in	arguing	that	a	just	legal	
order	ought	not	to	extend	a	criminal	defense	to	civil	disobedients.48		However,	
Horder	also	identifies	a	second	reason	not	to	extend	a	demands-of-conscience	
excuse	to	civil	disobedients,	namely	that	they	violate	the	law	deliberately	and	with	a	
political	aim,	i.e.	for	the	purpose	of	challenging	some	law	or	policy.		Brownlee	
focuses	on	the	latter	of	these	two	features,	which	she	refers	to	as	the	strategic	action	
problem,	but	I	believe	it	is	the	former	that	explains	why	civil	disobedience,	meaning	
conscientiously	motivated	communicative	disobedience	to	law,	does	not	qualify	for	
an	excuse.		As	Horder	puts	the	point,	“by	way	of	contrast	[to	a	civil	disobedient],	if	D	
is	to	be	excused	on	a	demands-of-conscience	basis,	his	or	her	engagement	in	the	
law-breaking	religious	practice	must	have	more	or	less	spontaneously	reflected,	in	
terms	of	reasons	for	action,	solely	and	simply	a	sense	of	moral	obligation.”49		Both	
the	spontaneity	of	a	conscientiously	motivated	actor’s	violation	of	the	law	and	her	
lack	of	any	communicative	intent	cohere	with,	and	provide	evidence	for,	its	arising	
																																																								
47	See	Brownlee	(2012:	174-78);	see	also	Lefkowitz	(2007:	211-17).	
48	Horder	(2004:	221-5).	
49	Horder	(2004:	201).	
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out	of	a	defect	in	the	actor’s	practical	reasoning	caused	by	the	emotional	pressure	to	
which	she	was	subject.		Where	that	pressure	was	such	that	it	would	not	be	
reasonable	or	justifiable	to	expect	her	not	to	make	the	error	in	practical	reasoning	
that	she	did,	the	conditions	for	a	complete	excuse	are	met.		Thus	it	is	the	nature	of	
excuses	that	rules	out	their	application	to	civil	disobedience,	not	the	incompatibility	
of	civil	disobedience	and	legitimate	democratic	authority.		In	short,	while	Horder	
correctly	maintains	that	that	a	just	legal	system	ought	not	to	excuse	acts	of	civil	
disobedience,	Brownlee	argues	correctly	that	those	who	perform	them	are	entitled	
to	a	demands-of-conviction	defense	(albeit	not	the	type	of	defense	for	which	she	
claims	to	be	arguing).			
	 The	foregoing	argument	may	give	rise	to	two	confusions	I	wish	to	dispel.		
First,	I	do	not	claim	that	spontaneous	disobedience	to	law	must	be	non-
communicative;	after	all,	many	historically	important	acts	of	civil	disobedience	
began	with	people	spontaneously	protesting	unjust	laws	or	policies	(and,	for	that	
matter,	entire	regimes).		Rather,	I	contend	only	that	when	it	is	excusable	
conscientiously	motivated	disobedience	to	law	will	be	spontaneous	and	non-
communicative	because	those	properties	characterize	conduct	that	can	be	explained	
in	the	manner	necessary	to	provide	an	agent	with	an	excuse	for	so	acting.		Second,	I	
have	not	argued	that	in	a	just	legal	system	no	one	who	might	be	colloquially	
described	as	a	civil	disobedient	could	ever	have	a	claim	to	be	legally	excused	for	her	
criminal	conduct.		All	else	equal	it	may	be	that	a	just	legal	system	ought	to	extend	an	
excusatory	legal	defense	to	those	conscientiously	motivated	disobedients	to	law	
who	fail	in	their	attempt	to	perform	civil	disobedience	(as	Brownlee	describes	it)	
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because	of	the	emotional	pressure	under	which	they	act.		An	actor	who	violated	one	
or	more	of	Brownlee’s	process	related	constraints	on	what	counts	as	civil	
disobedience	might	defend	herself	in	a	court	of	law	as	follows:	though	she	
committed	a	criminal	breach	without	a	legal	justification,	her	anger	and	frustration	
over	the	injustice	of	a	given	policy	and	the	apathy	of	political	leaders	and	her	fellow	
citizens	in	the	face	of	that	injustice	caused	her	to	mistakenly	conclude	that	her	
conduct,	though	illegal,	was	(legally)	justifiable.		I	went	too	far,	she	might	say,	an	apt	
description	insofar	as	it	implies	that	she	would	have	enjoyed	a	justificatory	legal	
defense	had	she	committed	certain	other	criminal	breaches	in	order	to	oppose	the	
policy	in	question.		We	need	not	worry	here	about	whether	(all	else	equal)	legal	
officials	ought	to	grant	such	an	actor	a	complete	excuse,	i.e.	an	excusatory	defense,	
or	at	most	a	partial	excuse	that	calls	for	conviction	on	a	lesser	offense	and/or	a	
reduction	in	sentence.		The	point	I	wish	to	emphasize	is	simply	that	the	conceptual	
argument	against	excusing	acts	of	civil	disobedience	set	out	in	the	previous	
paragraph	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	of	excusing	those	conscientiously	
motivated	actors	who	attempt	unsuccessfully	to	perform	communicative	acts	of	
disobedience	to	law.					
	 Brownlee,	too,	notes	that	conscientiously	motivated	law-breakers	who	
cannot	avail	themselves	of	a	demands-of-conviction	defense	may	nevertheless	wish	
to	call	the	state’s	attention	to,	in	her	words,	the	onerousness	for	them	of	abiding	by	
the	law.		“[E]ven	when	their	acts	are	not	fully	exculpable,	civil	disobedience	is	
disobedience	grounded	in	deeply	and	conscientiously	held	commitments	that	
understandably	make	it	difficult	for	disobedients	both	to	follow	laws	that	
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contravene	those	commitments	and	to	refrain	from	communicating	in	effective	
ways	their	objections	to	those	laws”	(Brownlee,	235).		Their	reason	for	doing	so,	
Brownlee	argues,	is	that	it	provides	the	state	with	a	reason	to	treat	them	mercifully,	
to	mitigate	its	punishment	not	as	a	matter	of	respect	for	them	as	responsible	agents	
but	out	of	concern	for	them	as	sentient	creatures	who	are	suffering.		Perhaps	it	does,	
though	a	court’s	attempt	to	respond	to	criminal	offenders	as	victims	risks	both	
interfering	with	its	primary	duty	to	respond	to	them	as	perpetrators	(i.e.	as	
responsible	agents)	and	muddying	the	public’s	perception	of	its	condemnation	of	
their	illegal	conduct.		More	importantly,	it	is	arguable	that	we	ought	to	distinguish	as	
best	we	can	between	a	person’s	conscientiously	held	commitments	making	it	so	
difficult	for	her	to	respond	properly	to	the	law	that	she	qualifies	for	at	least	a	partial	
excuse	for	her	criminal	conduct,	and	cases	where	the	onerousness	of	conforming	to	
the	law	does	not	rise	to	that	level.		In	the	former	case	the	civil	disobedient	warrants	
a	lesser	punishment	as	a	matter	of	justice,	while	in	the	latter	case	she	may	only	
plead	for	mercy.		
*	 *	 *	
	 The	fact	that	I	have	gone	on	at	length	regarding	what	I	believe	to	be	errors	in	
Brownlee’s	account	of	a	demands-of-conviction	defense	should	not	be	taken	as	a	
reason	to	spend	one’s	time	reading	other	texts.		Indeed,	quite	the	contrary;	
Conscience	and	Conviction	is	a	thought-provoking	work	full	of	insights	not	only	on	
the	topics	discussed	in	this	paper	but	on	practical	reasoning,	moral	pluralism,	and	
just	punishment	as	well.		Perhaps	the	book’s	most	outstanding	feature	is	the	moral	
sensitivity	Brownlee	displays	throughout;	this	book	does	not	merely	contain	an	
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account	of	conscience,	it	exemplifies	the	exercise	of	one.		Anyone	who	chooses	to	
engage	with	Brownlee’s	book	will	be	well	rewarded	for	his	or	her	decision	to	do	so.				
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